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BRITISH AIRWAYS V. PORT AUTHORITY:
ITS IMPACT ON AIRCRAFT NOISE REGULATION
ROBERT B. DONIN*
INTRODUCTION
On November 22, 1977, an Air France Concorde carrying a
full complement of passengers and dignitaries touched down at
John F. Kennedy International Airport, marking the first scheduled
arrival by a civil supersonic transport to America's principal inter-
national gateway. Among the guests on board was M. Maurice
Bellonte, age 81, who on September 1, 1930, had flown his Breu-
get airplane on the first non-stop flight from Paris to New York,
a journey of 37 hours, 18 minutes.' This day's trip over the same
route was to last only 3 hours, 30 minutes. And 90 seconds after
the arrival of the Paris flight, a Concorde in British Airways livery
set down behind it, opening the service to London
For many observers, the highly-publicized event proved anti-
climactic. Preliminary route-proving flights had already appeared
to confirm the claim of Concorde's supporters that the SST could
operate within the noise limits long applied to subsonic airplanes
by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which admin-
isters Kennedy Airport-at least during the cooler months of the
year and through the adroit selection of flight paths.
For Concorde's British and French developers, however, the in-
augural passenger flight represented the successful culmination of
*B.A., Colgate University, 1971; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1974.
Fulbright/Hays Scholar, 1977-78, University of London. The author served as
an attorney in the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Department of Transpor-
tation, during the time the litigation discussed in this paper was in progress. The
author is solely responsible for the views contained herein.
1 The first aviator to make the flight non-stop in the reverse direction, of
course, was Charles A. Lindbergh who on May 21, 1927, completed the trip in
33 hours, 29f minutes.
' Chronicled in The Times (London), Nov. 23, 1977, at 1.
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a legal and political battle that had ranged over twenty months.
Weeks earlier, the United States Supreme Court3 had declined to
disturb the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in British Airways Board v. Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey' that the Port Authority's ban on Concorde flights to JFK
was unreasonable, discriminatory, and therefore illegal. With New
York's vast pool of transatlantic traffic now open to Concorde
service, realistic efforts could begin to recoup the $60 million
spent by British Airways and Air France on each plane, and the
$3 billion invested by the British and French governments on re-
search and development. Hence, it became a matter of conviction
for the plane's backers that "as New York goes, so goes the Con-
corde." Ironically, airport-neighboring communities and environ-
mental groups that fought Concorde's entry undoubtedly adhered
to the same maxim, though with plainly contrary hopes as to the
outcome.
As in all cases, however, more was at stake in British Airways
v. Port Authority than the future of one historic and controversial
airplane. Through the suit over Concorde landing rights at New
York, the opposing parties would test established principles re-
garding aircraft noise regulation, and possibly shape new ones.
It is for this reason that the case merits considerable attention. The
purpose of this article is to examine the decisions generated by this
dispute and assess their impact on the regime of aircraft noise regu-
lation. I will first briefly sketch the development of the Concorde
and the simultaneous growth of laws and regulations addressing
environmental quality in general, and aircraft noise in particular.
After describing the setting of domestic and international law in
which the litigation took place-including the Secretary of Trans-
portation's authorization of a sixteen month demonstration and
3 On October 17, 1977, Justice Marshall of the Supreme Court rejected a re-
quest by the Port Authority to maintain its Concorde ban until the court had an
opportunity to review the lower court's decision. - U.S. -, 98 S.Ct. 291
(1977).
4 564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977). In addition to the Supreme Court order de-
nying review, four decisions were rendered: the initial decision of the District
Court, 431 F. Supp. 1216 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); the decision of the Court of Ap-
peals reversing and remanding for an evidentiary hearing, 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.
1977); the decision of the District Court on remand, 437 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); and the affirmance of that decision, as modified, by the Court of Appeals,
564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977).
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the Port Authority's adoption of a Concorde ban-I will present
the decisions rendered by the district court and court of appeals.
Finally, I will attempt to analyze how, if at all, these decisions
have transformed the law governing the regulation of aircraft
noise by federal, state and local entities.
THE DEVELOPING CONTROVERSY
In late summer 1975, British Airways and Air France initiated
the formal process of introducing limited Concorde service from
London and Paris to New York and Washington. No substantive
action by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was required since
the United States' bilateral air transport agreements with Britain
and France provided for these services without any specific restric-
tion as to type of aircraft;' British Airways and Air France already
held foreign air carrier permits issued by the CAB authorizing
service on the routes.' Before Concorde operations could begin
on a scheduled, commercial basis, however, it was necessary for
the carriers to secure amendment by the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) of their respective "operations specifications."'
The so-called "op specs" are, quite literally, specifications about
the flights to be undertaken: the type of aircraft to be flown, the
airports to be served, and the routes and flight procedures to be
followed.
Although approval of such amendments by the FAA in the past
had been virtually automatic, the ecological issues raised by Con-
corde made it likely that this latest "op specs" decision could
constitute a "major Federal action significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment" under the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).' Accordingly, the FAA undertook
preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement on the proposed
'5 United States-Great Britain Air Transport Services Agreement (Bermuda I),
60 Stat. 1499, T.I.A.S. No. 1507 (1946); superseded during the course of the
litigation by a replacement agreement (Bermuda II), - Stat. -_, T.I.A.S. No.
- (July 23, 1977); see Dep't of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXVII, No. 1990 (Aug.
15, 1977); United States-France Air Transport Services Agreement, 61 Stat.
3445, T.I.A.S. No. 1679 (1946).
' See section 402, Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended; 49 U.S.C. S
1372 (1970).
'See, 14 C.F.R. § 129 (1977).
842 U.S.C. § 4321, 4332 (1970).
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flights. The unusual importance of the environmental, technologi-
cal, and international questions posed by the Concorde operators'
requests, moreover, led then-Secretary of Transportation William
T. Coleman, Jr. to announce that he would personally judge the
application, notwithstanding that "op specs" were typically handled
as routine matters by the FAA bureaucracy.
By this time, Concorde had already become the focus of a
heated international debate. The Anglo-French Concorde Treaty of
1962 committed the two nations "to develop and produce jointly a
civil supersonic transport aircraft."' The formidable technological
challenge posed to British Aircraft Corporation and Aerospatiale
France by this terse declaration was the development of an aircraft
with both the aerodynamic characteristics necessary for long-haul
supersonic flight and the economic characteristics essential for
profitable operations. In 1965 the joint manufacturers made the
crucial selection of engines, thereby effectively "fixing" the design
of the plane for the future. The aircraft that finally emerged is a
comparatively small (by modem commercial standards) delta-
wing plane powered by four Rolls-Royce (Bristol) SNECMA
Olympus 593 engines, mounted in pairs in underwing nacelles
and equipped with afterburners. Cruising at approximately 1,350
miles per hour (or twice the speed of sound), at an altitude of
between 50,000 and 60,000 feet, it can carry up to 125 passengers
over a range of approximately 4,000 miles.
Concorde's manufacturers appreciated the importance of noise
abatement, if only out of self-interest. But they had little to show
for the $100 million invested in noise suppression efforts over
the period of development. The difficulty lay in the limitations in-
herent in the design and powerplant of a supersonic transport.
The noise generated by jet engines depends in large part on the
velocity of jet exhaust. Because of the thrust necessary for takeoff
and supersonic propulsion, Concorde's jet exhaust must have an
extremely high velocity. Moreover, because of the slender shape
compulsory in a plane of this type, it is particularly ill-suited to
the high-bypass ratio turbofan engines used so successfully toquiet subsonic jets.' In the context of the early sixties, Concorde's
9 British Command Papers, Cmnd. 1916; 453 U.N.T.S. 325.
"0 Department of Transportation/Federal Aviation Administration, Final En-
vironmental Impact Statement on Concorde Supersonic Transport (1975) IV-10
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noise appeared to its developers as a disturbing distraction, but
surely not one which either overshadowed the enormous benefits
that would be wrought by supersonic flight, or threatened the via-
bility of the project.
Even as the Concorde prototype took off on its first flight in
1969, however, the climate of public opinion regarding an aircraft
of this type had begun to change dramatically. NEPA, enacted
in 1969, committed the federal government to "create and main-
tain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony."'1 A year earlier Congress had, for the first time, ordered
federal action "to afford present and future relief and protection to
the public health and welfare from aircraft noise and sonic boom
.." by adding section 611 to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958."
In the Noise Control Act of 1972 Congress declared that "it is
the policy of the United States to promote an environment for all
Americans free from noise that jeopardizes their health and wel-
fare."' 3 The same legislation strengthened section 611 by trans-
ferring to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the power
to draft noise regulations for consideration by the FAA, and by pro-
hibiting the FAA from issuing new type certificates for aircraft "for
which substantial noise abatement can be achieved" unless noise
emission standards for those aircraft are first in place."' In per-
forming its task, the FAA is to consider whether any proposed stan-
dard or regulation is "consistent with the highest degree of safety
in air commerce"" and whether it is "economically reasonable,
technologically practicable, and appropriate for the particular type
of aircraft, aircraft engine, appliance, or certificate to which it
will apply.'"
Using the power conferred by section 611, the FAA in 1969 pro-
[hereinafter cited as Environmental Impact Statement]. FAA recently stated that
"there is no known technology which would reduce Concorde noise levels ....
42 Fed. Reg. 55,176 (1977). A good summary of the problems associated with
applying known aircraft noise suppression techniques to SSTs is found in Mont-
gomery, The Age of the Supersonic Jet Transport: Its Environmental and Legal
Impact, 36 J. Am L. & CoM. 577, 580-83 (1970).
11NEPA, Section 101; 42 U.S.C. S 4331 (1970).
1249 U.S.C. § 1431 (1970).
1342 U.S.C. § 4901(b) (1970).
1449 U.S.C. S 1431(b)(2) (1970).
"49 U.S.C. § 1431(d)(3) (1970).
1049 U.S.C. § 1431(d) (4) (1970).
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mulgated Part 36 of the Federal Aviation Regulations,' requiring
that newly type-certificated subsonic aircraft comply with pre-
scribed standards for noise, as measured at certain points under
the takeoff and landing paths and to the side of the runway. This
requirement was later extended to apply to individual subsonic
aircraft of a type certificated in 1969 but not manufactured before
1974-the extension having been made possible by the introduc-
tion of the new noise suppression technology for the current models
of earlier generation aircraft. By a separate regulation adopted in
1973, flight by civil aircraft at supersonic speed over the United
States-and the accompanying sonic boom-was outlawed."
At the time British Airways and Air France applied for amend-
ment of their operations specifications to permit Concorde service
to New York and Washington, however, the FAA had not yet
adopted either certification or operation regulations ' limiting the
noise created by SSTs when flying at subsonic speeds.'"
In the international sphere, the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) recognized the need for worldwide coor-
dination of aircraft noise standards and, in 1971, adopted "Inter-
17 14 C.F.R. 536 (1977).
's 14 C.F.R. § 91.55 (1977).
'0 As noted, supra, text accompanying notes 17-18, a certification regulation
generally establishes specified limits on engine noise as a precondition to issu-
ance of a United States type or airworthiness certificate. An operational rule, by
contrast, may apply to all aircraft, even if already certificated, or if flown in the
United States pursuant to the certification of another nation. See Convention on
International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), art. 33, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S.
No. 1591 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Chicago Convention] and text accom-
panying notes 82-86, infra. In addition, an operational rule is generally aimed
at mitigating aircraft noise through means other than the design of engines, such
as curfews, the use of preferential runways, the use of special approach and
departure procedures, or the exclusion of particular aircraft types from certain
airports.
'o The adoption of such regulations now appears imminent. On October 11,
1977, DOT and FAA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on SST noise.
42 Fed. Reg. 55,176 (1977). If adopted, the 16 Concordes completed or cur-
rently under construction would be permitted to operate at 13 United States
airports, subject to a 10 p.m. - 7 a.m. curfew and to the prerogative of airport
proprietors to limit SST operations "in a manner which is not unjustly discrimi-
natory and not unduly burdensome on commerce." Id., see text accompanying
notes 107-18, infra. Any additional SST's would not be permitted to operate in
the United States unless they met the same Part 36 noise emission criteria applied
to subsonic jets. An announcement stated that the "allowance for aircraft already
completed or presently under construction is consistent with the standard prac-
tice of excepting existing aircraft from proposed, prospective noise rules." De-
partment of Transportation News Release, Sept. 23, 1977.
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national Standards and Recommended Practices on Aircraft Noise"
in Annex 16 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation,
1944 (Chicago Convention)." Following the FAA's approach,
Annex 16 mandated that, after January 6, 1972, all ICAO member
States require compliance with specified noise standards-as mea-
sured at takeoff, landing, and sideline points-before issuing
an airworthiness certificate to subsonic aircraft engaged in inter-
national air navigation."
Although the Annex 16 requirements have never been applicable
to SSTs, a resolution by the ICAO Assembly as early as 1962
urged that countries developing civil supersonic aircraft ensure
that those aircraft "not create a noise exceeding the level then
accepted for the operation of subsonic jet aircraft." 3 In addition,
Chapter 4 of Annex 16, entitled "Supersonic Aeroplanes" advises
that
the provisions of Chapter 2 applicable to subsonic jet aeroplanes
may be used as guidelines for supersonic aeroplanes for which the
application for a certificate of airworthiness for the prototype was
accepted or another equivalent prescribed procedure was carried
out by the certificating authorities, on or after 1 January 1975.'
Perhaps the most visible evidence of changing attitudes, how-
ever, was the vote by Congress in 1971 to cut off funds for the
American supersonic transport being developed by the Boeing
Company. Although critical Congressmen appeared primarily to
be opposed to pouring public dollars into an essentially commercial
venture, a number of legislators also pointed to the potential en-
21See Chicago Convention, arts. 37 and 54, supra note 19. Annexes may be
formulated with regard to a broad range of subject including those "concerned
with the safety, regularity and efficiency of" aviation. Id., art. 37(k).
2 Like the Part 36 standards established by the FAA pursuant to § 611 of the
Federal Aviation Act, see notes 17-18, supra, the Annex 16 requirements have
been amended over time to (1) require compliance by new production versions
of aircraft already certificated at the time Annex 16 became applicable; and (2)
apply more stringent emission standards to be newest types of aircraft being in-
troduced.
I ICAO Assembly Resolutions in Force A14-7, Doe. 9,124 (1975). See also
Resolution A16-4, adopted in 1968. See generally, Kalsi, Aircraft Noise Abate-
ment via Annex 16 of the Chicago Convention-A Viable Alternative, 9 TEXAS
INT. L. J. 1 (1974).
"4 Applications to the British, French, and United States aviation authorities
for certificates of airworthiness for the current model Concorde were accepted
prior to this date.
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vironmental risks posed by an American SST.' The wide-body
B-747, DC-10, and L-1011 planes which came into service instead
-- equipped with high bypass-ratio turbofan engines-were the
cleanest and quietest large commercial aircraft manufactured to
date.
To many observers, Concorde boldly cut against this grain of
progress. "[W]hat nobody noticed because no one was responsible
for looking at it," acknowledged Anthony Wedgwood Benn, the
former British Minister of Technology, "was that at the time the
aircraft was born, speed was everything and by the time it has
been produced, the environment is everything."" A number of
environmentalists argued that Concorde operations would cause
an increase in skin cancer by emitting nitrogen exhaust, reducing
the concentration of ozone in the stratosphere, and permitting
more ultraviolet radiation to reach the earth's surface."' Others
condemned Concorde for its thirsty consumption of scarce fuel
resources." By far the greatest source of criticism, however, was
Concorde's noise. While there was no danger of Americans being
rocked by supersonic booms (supersonic flight over the United
States being prohibited)," Concorde was- perceived as noisier than
existing aircraft when flying at subsonic speeds. This aspect of Con-
corde's performance is so central to the overall controversy sur-
rounding the aircraft that it merits a substantial digression at this
point.
2 See, J. COSTELLO and T. HUGHES, CONCORDE: THE INTERNATIONAL RACE
FOR A SUPERSONIC PASSENGER TRANSPORT 166-190 (1975); A. WILSON, TiE
CONCORDE FIASCO 75-85 (1973); Critical Vote Nears for SST Funding, Av.
WEEK & SPACE TECH., March 15, 1971, at 26-28.
2G. KNIGHT, CONCORDE: THE INSIDE STORY 137 (1976).
27 This theory was described in the Concorde Environmental Impact State-
ment, supra note 10, at VI-107-187 and evaluated by the Secretary of Transporta-
tion in his Decision on Concorde Supersonic Transport, February 4, 1976, at
36-41 [hereinafter cited as Secretary's Decision]. It is summarized by the author
in an earlier article regarding Concorde, Safety Regulation of the Concorde Su-
personic Transport: Realistic Confinement of the National Environmental Policy
Act, 8 TRANS. L. J. 47, 52 (1976).
2 Concorde consumes 20,857 gallons of fuel to carry 110 passengers over
3,000 nautical miles. By comparison, the Boeing 747 uses 24,285 gallons of fuel
to carry 375 passengers over the same distance. See, Secretary's Decision, supra
note 27, at 29.
29 14 C.F.R. § 91.55 (1977). In retrospect, it is intriguing to note that, prior
to the promulgation of this regulation, commentators focused their concern al-
most entirely on the effect of sonic booms. See, e.g., Kline, The SST and Inverse
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1. Concorde Noise
Scientists and psychologists have developed several "descriptors"
for measuring aircraft noise. The simplest method, of course, is
to measure the noise emitted by a single aircraft flying overhead
in terms of the widely-known scale of decibels (db), which mea-
sures pressure on the ear. To more accurately represent a sound
in terms of human annoyance it creates, however, one must de-
scribe sound not only in terms of intensity but also in terms of dura-
tion, pitch, and frequency. Hence, descriptors such as the PNdB
unit (perceived noise in decibels) and the EPNdB Unit (effective
perceived noise in decibels) have been developed to reflect the
added irritation generally caused by lengthy duration or high
frequency. Using any one of these standards, the relative noisiness
of different aircraft at a given measuring point may be gauged.
(One must, of course, remember that the noise measurement re-
corded reflects not only inherent characteristics of the aircraft
design and engines but also the rate of climb, flight path, and
engine thrust setting employed during any particular overflight.)
Using the EPNdB standard, the Environmental Impact State-
ment prepared for the Secretary of Transportation's decision com-
pared Concorde to several subsonic transport category aircraft at
the standard measuring points used in the FAA's Part 36 noise regu-
lations."0 Although Concorde proved slightly quieter than a B-707
on landing, it was approximately half-again as loud as a B-707
and more than twice as loud as a B-747 on takeoff."
Condemnation, 15 VILL. L. REV. 887 (1970); Baxter, The SST: From Watts to
Harlem in Two Hours, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1968).
o See text accompanying notes 17-18.
" The Environmental Impact Statement, supra note 10, VI-7-8 compared
Concorde's noise levels in EPNdB to those of large subsonic transports at the
Part 36 measuring points.
Concorde B-707-300 DC-8-61 B-747-200 DC-10-30
Takeoff 119.5 113 116 107 104
Sideline 112.0 102 103 98 97
Approach 116.5 118 117 106 108
A 10 decibel increase in sound level is considered a doubling of the perceived
loudness or noisiness of a sound. Id., VI-39.
Following are some typical EPNdB levels encountered in daily life:
busy restaurant 78
home vacuum cleaner at 10 feet 82
heavy city traffic 105
home lawn mower 111
air hammer 120
Id., VI-46-47.
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Moreover, it was not merely the level of Concorde's noise which
caused objections. A given decibel level emitted by one aircraft
may extend out over a much broader geographical area-and
envelop many more people-than the same level of noise emitted
by another aircraft. To measure this dimension of aircraft noise
impact, experts have developed the so-called "single event noise
contour" or "noise footprint." Under this system, monitors plot
the geographical radius of various PNdB or EPNdB levels as a
result of a takeoff or landing by a particular aircraft. On this
basis, Concorde was, to use the jargon, a 'large noise contour"
aircraft. On takeoff, for example, Concorde subjected 47.6 square
miles of land to noise levels of at least 100 EPNdB, as compared
with 7.49 square miles for the B-707 and 2.91 square miles for
the B-747."'
In addition to these techniques for measuring the noise generated
by a single flight, experts have developed means of measuring the
cumulative noise generated at given points around an airport during
a twenty-four hour period. One such descriptor of cumulative noise
is the Noise Exposure Forecast (NEF), which is also corrected
for particularly irritating sounds such as high-pitched jet whine or
late-evening flights. As with the single event noise measures, the
cumulative noise measurements at various geographical points
may be linked to form contours. In general, areas within the NEF
30 contour are thought to be moderately noise-impacted; areas
within the NEF 40 contour are thought to be seriously noise-
impacted; and areas within contours greater than NEF 40 are
thought to suffer unacceptably high levels of noise.' By observing
the enlargement of high NEF contours caused by the introduction
of operations by a given aircraft, one may describe the annoyance
specifically attributable to those flights over and above the noise
already suffered at the airport in question. Forecasts in the En-
vironmental Impact Statement projected that while Concorde op-
erations at Dulles Airport would not significantly increase the
number of people within either the NEF 30 or NEF 40 contours,
32 Environmental Impact Statement, supra note 10, VI-9-10; VI-15-16; VI-18.
33 Environmental Impact Statement, supra note 10, VI-64. See also FAA
Certification of the SST Concorde: Hearings Before the Government Activities
and Transportation Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Op-
erations, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 345 (1975-1976) (statement of John E.
Wesler).
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Concorde flights to Kennedy Airport would add 2,000 people to
each zone."
Finally, analysis indicated that the noise emitted by Concorde's
engines also contained a greater proportion of low frequency sound
which could induce vibration in homes and other buildings located
near airports, as well as their contents. The Environmental Impact
Statement found:
The low frequency noise content of the Concorde is likely to
induce or produce some vibrations given the volume of low fre-
quency energy and the lesser attenuation of low frequency energy.
This in turn is likely to induce, during the time of a Concorde
takeoff-approximately 30 seconds-some household rattle of
dishes, pictures, lamps and other bric-a-brac being disturbed
(especially objects in contact with walls). This in turn could pro-
duce secondary sources of noise which may disturb people because
of the psychological influence of private possessions being dis-
turbed.'
2. The Coleman Decision and the Port Authority's Response
On February 4, 1976, the Secretary of Transportation issued
a sixty-one page decision approving the amendment of the opera-
tions specifications of British Airways and Air France to allow four
Concorde flights per day to Kennedy Airport and two flights per
day to Dulles Airport, but only for an experimental sixteen month
period and subject to a curfew, as well as other operating limi-
tations."
In his decision, later described by the Court of Appeals for the
34 Environmental Impact Statement, supra note 10, VI-154.
35 Environmental impact Statement, supra note 10, VI-97.
3' Secretary's Decision, supra note 27, at 3. The conditions under which the
demonstration flights must be carried out include:
1. No flight may be scheduled for landing or take-off in the United
States before 7 A.M. local time or after 10 P.M. local time.
*i * *
3. Authorization of any commercial flights in addition to those
specifically permitted by this action shall constitute a new major
federal action within the terms of NEPA and therefore require
a new Environmental Impact Statement.
5. The FAA is authorized to impose such additional noise abate-
ment procedures as are safe, technologically feasible, economic-
ally justified, and necessary to minimize the noise impact, includ-
ing, but not limited to, the thrust cut-back on departure.
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Second Circuit as "the very paragon of a clear and considered
administrative action,""7 Coleman conducted a detailed review of
the probable environmental effects of Concorde flights, as well as
the implications an absolute rejection of Concorde would have for
future technological development and United States relations with
Great Britain and France. With respect to the issue of Concorde's
low frequency sound, he found that overflight would cause brief
and "barely perceptible" vibration of walls and floors but that these
vibrations "do not present any danger of structural damage and
little possibility of annoyance." 8 Furthermore, none of the available
descriptors, Coleman concluded, adequately reflected the subjective
nature of aircraft noise or dictated a decision.
The noise analysis is quite complete, yet it gives me no clear di-
rection. The cumulative noise descriptor shows that the increase
in the number of people who live in the NEF 30 area at JFK
would constitute substantially less than one per cent of those cur-
rently exposed to NEF 30. At the same time, the cumulative
noise figures show that hundreds of thousands of people would
find that they lived in a somewhat noisier environment.
Perhaps even more significantly, the noise data provide me with
only a descriptive and statistical view of the noise impact. Noise
is not an objective experience; people do not agree on how ob-
jectionable a given sound may be.
The EIS indicates to me that the marginal impact of six additional
flights would be small. Given the subjective nature of human re-
sponse to noise, however, I must conclude that if any flights at
all are justified-that is, if there is sufficient affirmative reason
for permitting Concorde flights that we are willing to suffer some
environmental effect-those flights should be authorized only
on a temporary basis, in order to permit a more intelligent and
responsible decision to be made at some point in the future, after
we have collected information on the subjective response to Con-
corde during actual operations."
Since Dulles Airport, located in Virginia, is owned by the fed-
eral government and operated by the FAA, Coleman's decision
cleared the way for the sixteen month Concorde demonstration
37 558 F.2d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1977).
"Secretary's Decision, supra note 27, at 43.
3" Secretary's Decision, supra note 27, 48-50.
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to begin there.' In New York, the Secretary recognized, the situa-
tion was less clear. As he observed in a footnote:
The FAA is the proprietor of Dulles and it is therefore part of
my decision today to direct the Federal Aviation Administrator to
permit one Concorde flight per day at Dulles by each carrier under
the conditions noted. The situation with respect to JFK may be
complicated by the fact that under federal policy that has hitherto
prevailed a local airport proprietor has had authority under cer-
tain circumstances to refuse landing rights. If for any legitimate
and legally binding reason it should turn out that the JFK part
of the demonstration could not go forward-and no one has indi-
cated to me any such final disposition by JFK's proprietor-that
would obviously be extremely unfortunate and would greatly
diminish, but in my opinion it would not destroy, the validity of the
demonstration.'
To date, the Port Authority had adopted two aircraft noise
abatement regulations. The first, adopted in 1951 and still in force,
prohibits any jet from landing or taking off without the Port Au-
thority's permission. Although employed to ban airplanes on
several early occasions, this rule was overshadowed, as a practical
matter, by a 1958 regulation setting 112 PNdB as the maximum
permissable noise level of aircraft on takeoff, as measured by noise
monitors installed at selected points in communities around the
airport. The designation of 112 PNdB was not based upon any psy-
chological evaluation of what noise level is tolerable, but rather
upon the noise level produced by the DC-6B piston airplane.
Hence, the 112 PNdB rule was designed essentially to prevent
further deterioration of the existing noisy environment by the
introduction of jets. '
These remained the only noise regulations administered by the
Port Authority until, on March 11, 1976, approximately one
month after the Secretary of Transportation's decision giving fed-
" Concorde flights to Dulles Airport did, in fact, begin on May 24, 1976,
after a number of plaintiffs unsuccessfully challenged the Secretary of Trans-
portation's decision on a variety of grounds. Environmental Defense Fund et al.
v. Department of Transportation, No. 76-1105 (D.C. Cir., May 19, 1976). This
litigation was described in an earlier article by the author cited, supra, note 27.
" Secretary's Decision, supra note 27, n.3.
'2The bi-state agency's efforts to deal with the aircraft noise problem are re-
counted by counsel for the Port Authority in Lesser, The Aircraft Noise Prob-
lem: Federal Power but Local Liability, 3 URBAN LAWYER 175, 198 (1971).
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eral approval, the Port Authority adopted a resolution banning
supersonic aircraft from Kennedy Airport "until after at least six
months of operating experience (at Dulles, Heathrow, and De-
Gaulle Airports) has been evaluated, after a report on such ex-
perience has been made to the Board, and pending further action
thereon by the Board."
One week later, British Airways and Air France filed suit in
the District Court for the Southern District of New York to have
the Port Authority's Concorde ban declared invalid.
THE LEGAL BACKGROUND
In its principal counts, the complaint of the British and French
airlines seeking landing rights for Concorde at Kennedy Airport
appeared to ply familiar-if nonetheless murky-waters in avia-
tion noise litigation by invoking the doctrine of federal supremacy.
Specifically, the carriers alleged that the Port Authority ban (1)
invaded an area preempted by the federal government for its exclu-
sive control; (2) conflicted with, and frustrated, the valid exercise
of regulatory authority by the federal government; and (3) unduly
burdened foreign commerce. In addition, they advanced the more
novel argument that the ban was invalid in that it (4) violated
treaties and international agreements made by the United States
with the British and French governments; and (5) interfered with
the federal government's conduct of foreign relations.
Constitutional law has witnessed the formulation of several doc-
trines that refine the general directives of the Supremacy' and
Commerce" Clauses. In examining the issues in British Airways
v. Port Authority, however, it is well to distinguish three princi-
pal doctrines so derived: "conflict"; "preemption"; and "burden
on commerce."'
43 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
44 U.S. Const. art. I, 5 8, cl. 3.
,5 Lest these categories take on lives of their own, it is worthwhile recalling
1ustice Black's observation in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67-68 (1941):
This Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the light
of treaties or federal laws touching the same subject, has made use
of the following expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying
the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency;
violation; curtailment; and interference. But none of these expres-
sions provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive con-
stitutional yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be no one cry-
1977] BRITISH AIRWAYS V. PORT AUTHORITY 705
"Conflict" may be said to arise when a state or local measure
directly contradicts a federal law or regulatory action; in any such
case the State or local measure may not validly be enforced."6 "Pre-
emption," by contrast, arises when a state or local measure, though
not in direct contradiction of federal law, invades a field reserved
by Congress for exclusive federal supervision." In Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., Justice Douglas described the hallmarks of pre-
emptive Congressional intent.
The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States
to supplement it .... Or the Act of Congress may touch a field
in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject.... Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the fed-
eral law and the character of obligations imposed by it may
reveal the same purpose. . . . Or the state policy may produce
a result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute."
The power of Congress "to regulate Commerce . . among the
several states" places a separate but closely related constraint on
the power of states and localities. In general, a state or local law
or regulation will pass Commerce Clause scrutiny only if it is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest and the burden it
imposes on interstate commerce is outweighed by the state pur-
pose involved.'
Separately and in combination, "preemption," "conflict," and
"burden on commerce" have been invoked by litigants to strike
down a wide variety of state and local regulations. In the aviation
context, however, the doctrines have had a sui generis development.
stal clear distinctly marked formula. Our primary function is to de-
termine whether, under the circumstances of this particular case,
Pennsylvania's law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
48See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); Perez v. Camp-
bell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963).
4
7See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229-30 (1947);
Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1926); Pennsylvania
v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504-05 (1956).
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
SSee, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959). Compare, S.C. Highway Dep't
v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
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To fully understand this one must first understand the law assign-
ing liability for aircraft noise damages, as well as the evolving
character of federal regulation."
In Griggs v. Allegheny County,1 the Supreme Court held that
the county as owner-operator of Pittsburgh Airport was the "taker"
of an aircraft noise easement and the entity required by the Four-
teenth Amendment to pay compensation. 2 The Court specifically
rejected the contention that the federal government, rather than
the county, should be held liable because of its promotion of na-
tional airport development-including the approval and funding
of airport development plans-and its regulation of the national
airspace system."
"
0 See, generally, A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS,
Chap. V (1972); Vittek, Airport Noise Control-Can Communities Live With-
out It? Can Airlines Live With It?, 38 J. AIR L. & CoM. 473, 496-502 (1972).
51369 U.S. 84 (1962).
2 The principle that overflight could result in a compensable taking within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment had been accepted by the Supreme Court
many years earlier in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), a case in-
volving operations by army and navy aircraft over a commercial chicken farm
to an airfield leased by the United States. While approving a taking theory, Causby
sounded the death knell for noise suits based on a trespass theory, observing that
the ancient maxim cujus est solum ejus est urque ad coelum (he who owns
the land, it is his up to the heavens) has no place in the modern world. 328
U.S. at 261. See 5 104 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (1970),
which provides that there is "recognized and declared to exist in behalf of any
citizen of the United States a public right of freedom of transit through the
navigable airspace of the United States."
"2 Justice Douglas, for the Court majority, observed:
It is argued that though there was a "taking," someone other than
respondent was the taker-the airlines or the C.A.A. [i.e., the Civil
Aviation Authority, predecessor of the FAA] acting as an author-
ized representative of the United States. We think, however, that
respondent, which was the promoter, owner, and lessor of the
airport, was in these circumstances the one who took the air ease-
ment in the constitutional sense. Respondent decided, subject to
the approval of the C.A.A., where the airport would be built,
what runways it would need, their direction and length, and what
land and navigation easements would be needed. The Federal Gov-
ernment takes nothing; it is the local authority which decides to
build an airport vel non, and where it is to be located. We see no
difference between its responsibility for the air easements necessary
for operation of the airport and its responsibility for the land on
which the runways were built.
369 U.S. at 89.
Justice Black, joined by Justice Frankfurter, dissented, citing the extensive
involvement of the federal government in airport development and placing par-
ticular emphasis on 5 1108 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. 5 1508 (1970),
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Although they must bear the brunt of financial responsibility
under Griggs, the ability of airport operators to take defensive
measures was thrown seriously into doubt by a series of cases
which suggested that federal authority in the field was exclusive.
In Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst" the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals struck down a village ordinance prohibiting
overflights at an altitude of less than 1,000 feet on the ground that
the federal government had preempted the field of air traffic regu-
lation pursuant to the Commerce Clause and that the village or-
dinance conflicted with federal statutes and regulations.. Employing
similar reasoning, the same court in American Airlines, Inc. v.
Town of Hempstead"5 held invalid a town ordinance forbidding the
operation of aircraft which created a noise within the town exceed-
ing specified limits. The crux of the court's holding was that Hemp-
stead's ordinance, no less than Cedarhurst's, invaded the federal
domain of air traffic control since "some noise ordinances neces-
sarily regulate flight paths.""
Since the regulations at issue in Cedarhurst and Hempstead
had a direct impact on air traffic control-a critical safety func-
tion which, by its very nature, must be the exclusive preserve of the
FAA-the court in these two cases was able to identify a conflict
with Federal law and, in the case of Cedarhurst only, a narrow
form of preemption limited to airspace management.' Neither
which declares that the United States possesses "complete and exclusive national
sovereignty in the airspace of the United States." 369 U.S. at 90-93.
238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969).
Id., at 376.
'
t See also American Airlines, Inc. v. City of Audubon Park, Ky., 297 F.
Supp. 207 (W.D. Ky. 1968), afJ'd, 407 F.2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 845 (1969), holding invalid an ordinance similar to that involved in
Cedarhurst on grounds, inter alia, that Congress has preempted the field of air
traffic control. Id., at 212.
An earlier case, Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal.
2d 582, 394 P.2d 548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964), had stated in dictum that Con-
gress did not intend to preempt even the field of airspace management and that
state action affecting flight operations is not precluded, provided it does not con-
flict with federal regulation. Since airspace management is the quitessential ex-
ample of a field which admits "only of one uniform system, or plan of regula-
tion," Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851), it is not
surprising that the view expressed in Loma Portal did not gain acceptance. Both
the Supreme Court in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624,
627 (1973) and the Second Circuit in the principal case considered in this paper,
British Airways v. Port Authority, 558 F.2d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 1977), clearly as-
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court, however, needed to decide whether a broader preemption
ousted state and local authorities totally from the field of aircraft
noise regulation, even where there was no impact on safety. Equal-
ly important, as would be seen in later cases, was the fact that in
both Cedarhurst and Hempstead the regulations successfully at-
tacked had been promulgated by a town or village situated near
the airport, rather than the proprietor of the airport itself.
By the time the issue received Supreme Court attention in City
of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal," federal authority to regu-
late the flight of aircraft had been supplemented by a federal com-
mitment to reduce aircraft noise, in the form of section 611 of
the Federal Aviation Act." Pursuant to the statute, enacted in 1968
and amended by the Noise Control Act of 1972, the FAA had al-
ready prescribed maximum noise emission levels for new transport
category aircraft. While referring to possible conflicts with federal
air traffic control,"0 the Court in Burbank explicitly identified pre-
emption as the basis for holding invalid a city ordinance that
prohibited jet takeoffs between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. from the pri-
vately owned Hollywood-Burbank Airport. Speaking through Jus-
tice Douglas, the Court held: "It is the pervasive nature of the
scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise that leads us to con-
clude that there is pre-emption."'" The Court further stated:
Control of noise is of course deep seated in the police power of
the States. Yet the pervasive control vested in EPA and in FAA
under the 1972 Act seems to us to leave no room for local curfews
or other local controls .... The procedures under the 1972 Act
are under way. In addition, the Administrator has imposed a
sumed that all units of state and local government, whether acting as airport
proprietor or exercising police power, are preempted from this field. But see
Port of New York Authority v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 745
(E.D.N.Y. 1966) (proprietary scheme prohibiting the operation of jets on noise-
sensitive runways held not preempted by federal authority over airspace man-
agement).
08411 U.S. 624 (1973).
49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1970).
60411 U.S. at 627.
"I Id., at 633. Four Justices, led by Justice Rehnquist, dissented, contending
that under § 611 and other provisions of the Federal Aviation Act Congress in-
tended only to preempt lesser authorities from regulating flight operations and
the reduction of noise at the source (i.e., the design and manufacture of aircraft
and aircraft engines), while expressly leaving other noise abatement techniques
available to local jurisdictions. 411 U.S. at 640-54.
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variety of regulations relating to takeoff and landing procedures
and runway preferences. The Federal Aviation Act requires a deli-
cate balance between safety and efficiency, .... and the protection
of persons on the ground . .. Any regulations adopted by the
Administrator to control noise pollution must be consistent with
the "highest degree of safety." . . . The interdependence of these
factors requires a uniform and exclusive system of federal regu-
lations if the congressional objectives underlying the Federal Avia-
tion Act are to be fulfilled.
If we were to uphold the Burbank ordinance and a significant
number of municipalities followed suit, it is obvious that fraction-
alized control of the timing of take-offs and landings would severely
limit the flexibility of the FAA in controlling air traffic flow. The
difficulties of scheduling flights to avoid congestion and the con-
comitant decrease in safety would be compounded."
Yet at the same time that it found compelling reasons against
"letting the States and municipalities in on the planning"" of noise
abatement procedures through techniques such as curfews, the
Court left open the possibility that the identical antinoise techni-
ques, when imposed by the airport owner-operator, could survive
constitutional attack. A crucial footnote, reviewing the legislative
history of section 611, noted:
The letter from the Secretary of Transportation [to the Senate
Commerce Committee] also expressed the view that "the pro-
posed legislation will not affect the rights of a State or local pub-
lic agency, as the proprietor of an airport, from issuing regulations
or establishing requirements as to the permissable level of noise
which can be created by aircraft using the airport. Airport owners
acting as proprietors can presently deny the use of their airports
to aircraft on the basis of noise considerations so long as such
exclusion is nondiscriminatory." This portion as well was quoted
with approval in the Senate Report. [S. Rep. No. 1353, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 6]
Appellants and the Solicitor General submit that this indicates
that a municipality with jurisdiction over an airport has the power
to impose a curfew on the airport, notwithstanding federal respon-
sibility in the area. But, we are concerned here not with an ordin-
ance imposed by the City of Burbank as "proprietor" of the airport,
but with the exercise of police power. While the Hollywood-Bur-
bank Airport may be the only major airport which is privately
"'Id. at 638-39.
63 Id. at 640.
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owned, many airports are owned by one municipality yet physically
located in another. For example, the principal airport serving
Cincinnati is located in Kentucky. Thus, authority that a munici-
pality may have as a landlord is not necessarily congruent with
its police power. We do not consider here what limits, if any,
apply to a municipality as a proprietor.'
This qualification to the Court's otherwise sweeping language
finding preemption raised several perplexing questions. The first
grew out of the fact that, as the Court acknowledged, Hollywood-
Burbank Airport was one of the only commercial airports in the
country under private ownership. If, as in so many other cases,
airports were owned and operated by the municipality in which
they were situated, what reality lay in the distinction between
"proprietary power" and "police power?" If the proprietary au-
thority suggested by the Court were, indeed, established in a sub-
sequent case, the exception to Burbank's finding of preemption
would envelop the rule; as a practical matter, federal preemption
would remain viable only in the rare instances where municipalities
sought to regulate noise from privately owned airports or airports
in another jurisdiction.' No less troubling was the fact that the
underpinnings of the Burbank decision itself-the need for cer-
tralized control of air traffic flow, the pervasive nature of the
scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise, and the FAA's role
in ensuring that efficiency and safety are not sacrificed in the effort
to achieve noise abatement-apply just as forcibly to proprietary
as to non-proprietary restrictions.
The Supreme Court in Burbank had been able fortuitously to
sidestep the conflict between persuasive policy considerations fa-
voring exclusive federal power, on the one hand, and apparent
Congressional intent to leave a measure of authority to airport
proprietors, on the other. But in National Aviation v. City of
Hayward, Judge Peckham found himself squarely "caught on the
"Id. at 635-36, n.14 (emphasis supplied). The intent not to preempt was re-
affirmed by Congress when it strengthened § 611 in the Noise Control Act of
1972. See S. Rep. No. 92-1160, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1972); H.R. Rep.
No. 92-842, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1972).
'3In dissent, Justice Rehnquist observed: "It simply strains credulity to be-
lieve that the Secretary, the Senate Committee, or Congress intended that all air-
ports except the Hollywood-Burbank Airport could enact curfews." 411 U.S. at
652.
1977] BRITISH AIRWAYS V. PORT AUTHORITY 711
horns of [this] particularly sharp dilemma."" At issue was an
ordinance enacted by the City of Hayward, California, but
adopted by the city in its capacity as proprietor of Hayward Air
Terminal. The measure prohibited all aircraft which exceed a noise
level of 75 dBA6' from landing at or taking off from the field be-
tween 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. Plaintiffs argued that the Hayward or-
dinance invaded a field preempted by federal law and, in addition,
that it imposed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.
With regard to the first claim, the court reviewed the statements
contained in the legislative history of section 611 expressing the
intent not to preempt proprietor controls, as well as the preface
to Part 36 of the Federal Aviation Regulations in which the FAA
declares that "[r]esponsibility for determining the permissible noise
levels for aircraft using an airport remains with the proprietor of
that airport."6 Judge Peckham reasoned:
If on one hand, we follow the dicta in footnote 14 of the Burbank
opinion, which is intended to comport with the court's holding in
" 418 F. Supp. 417, 424 (N.D. Cal. 1976). Previously, in Air Transport Asso-
ciation of America v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975), a three-judge
court held that a California statute requiring that airport operators develop and
implement measures to achieve a specified level of noise reduction was not per se
invalid. The court stated:
It is now firmly established that the airport proprietor is respons-
ible for the consequences which attend his operation of a public
airport; his right to control the use of the airport is a necessary
concomitant, whether it be directed by state police power or his
own initiative [footnotes omitted].
389 F. Supp. at 63-64. No specific regulation was under review, however.
In another case decided after the enactment of S 611 of the Federal Aviation
Act but before Burbank, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts concluded in an
advisory opinion that a proposed state statute denying the use of airports located
within the state to SST's would be invalid. The decision anticipated Hayward
by assuming, based on the legislative history of 5 611, that airport proprietors
could continue to exercise noise control powers, and striking down the proposed
statute on the grounds that it "is not framed in terms of a State or local public
agency acting as an airport proprietor and operator" and thus "exceeds any area
which may still be left subject to State regulation." Opinion of the Justices, 359
Mass. 778, 271 N.E.2d 354, 358 (1971). The opinion, however, went on to ob-
serve that even if the bill were framed in terms of proprietary authority, there
would still be "serious doubt" about its constitutionality because the FAA had
recently published a notice of proposed rulemaking on SST noise. The precise
legal effect of this regulatory act was not spelled out, although the court noted
that it might "conflict" with the proposed Massachusetts law. Id.
""A-weighted" decibels, another noise descriptor.
6834 Fed. Reg. 18,355. See also 14 C.F.R. § 36.5A (1977) ("No determina-
tion is made, under this part, that these noise levels are or should be acceptable
or unacceptable for operation at, into, or out of, any airport.").
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Griggs, we will severely undercut the rationale of Burbank's find-
ing of preemption. If on the other hand, we disregard the pro-
prietor exception as dicta in order to fully effectuate the Burbank
rationale, we impose upon airport proprietors the responsibility
under Griggs for obtaining the requisite noise easements, yet deny
them the authority to control the level of noise produced at their
airports. This is, of course, exactly what the Senate Commerce
Committee indicated that the 1972 amendment to section 611
of the Federal Aviation Act was not intended to do. See Senate
Report No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. pp. 6-7.
In the opinion of this court, it is ultimately this clear expression
of legislative intent which must control our decision. . .. "
With regard to the Commerce Clause argument, the court found,
on the facts presented, that the burden imposed on plaintiffs' com-
mercial operations was "incidental at best and clearly not exces-
sive" in view of the city's legitimate goal of noise abatement."0
In resolving the issue of proprietor power left unanswered in
Burbank, however, the decision in Hayward spawned its own
new questions. What limits, if any, would remain on the preroga-
tive of airport operators to regulate aircraft noise? Presumably,
the prohibition on interference with federal airspace management
-applied in relation to non-proprietors in Hempstead and Cedar-
hurst- would also be a check on proprietors because of the cata-
strophic events which could follow from the absence of centralized
air traffic control. Less clear was the fate of proprietor-imposed
curfews. In Burbank, Justice Douglas had observed that such or-
dinances, if imposed at airports across the country, could have
the deleterious effect of "bunching" flights around the time of the
curfew."' Although the noise reduction technique approved in Hay-
ward itself was a curfew, it applied only to aircraft exceeding a
noise level of 75 dBA and on the particular facts of the case was
shown to affect very few commercial operations. Given a different
pattern of operations, a somewhat more restrictive curfew, or a
complete ban on certain types of noisy aircraft, might the same
court have dismissed the preemption count but invalidated the
measure as an undue burden on commerce? Less severe regulations,
69418 F. Supp. at 424.
7 1 d. at 427.
'1411 U.S. at 627-28.
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such as a limitation on engine "run ups"" or a requirement that
aircraft be towed to runway takeoff positions, were presumably
safe from attack on this ground.
In addition to these remaining constitutional checks, however,
lay the conditions for the exercise of proprietary powers laid down
by Congress itself. The legislative history of section 611 of the
Federal Aviation Act conveyed Congress' intention to abstain from
preempting airport operators, but also suggested that this absten-
tion was conditional. In reporting favorably on the 1968 Act the
Senate Commerce Committee had quoted with approval a letter
from former-Secretary of Transportation Alan S. Boyd observing
that "[alirport owners acting as proprietors can presently deny
the use of their airports to aircraft on the basis of noise considera-
tions so long as such exclusion is nondiscriminatory."" This quali-
fication was implicitly reaffirmed by Congress in amending section
611 in the Noise Control Act of 1972, through statements by the
relevant committees that the new act was not intended to alter the
pre-existing apportionment of powers."
Finally, notwithstanding the residue of proprietary control seem-
ingly mandated by Congress, none of the previous cases, including
Hayward, had directly involved international aviation. Were in-
ternational flights affected, questions might still arise as to the
vitality of proprietary restrictions in light of the United States'
obligations under the system of multilateral and bilateral aviation
agreements. While the Chicago Convention ' establishes the frame-
work for international safety regulation and the reciprocal recog-
nition by nations of standards of airworthiness and competence,
it does not establish operating rights for scheduled services between
nations." Rather, the exchange of traffic rights is negotiated be-
tween nations and incorporated into bilateral agreements which
generally go on to set out broad provisions with regard to fares,
capacity, and other conditions of operation." Although the practice
72 The ground testing of aircraft engines at full power after maintenance.
" S. Rep. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1968) (emphasis added).
I H.R. Rep. No. 92-842, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1972); S. Rep. No. 92-1160,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1972).
'-'Supra note 19.
"1 Id. art. 6.
"See generally, B. CHENG, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 25,
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of including specific terms regarding aircraft noise is not unprece-
dented,"8 it is highly unusual. Consistent with the general pattern,
the bilateral air transport agreement between the United States
and France"9 (which is virtually identical in relevant respects to
the United States bilateral agreement with Great Britain," as well
as the United States standard form bilateral agreement81) does not
refer either to environmental regulation or to the type of aircraft
that may be used. Article II(b), however, states:
The designated air carrier or carriers may be required to satisfy
the aeronautical authorities of the Contracting Party granting
the rights that it or they is or are qualified to fulfill the conditions
prescribed by or under the laws and regulations normally applied
by those authorities to the operations of commercial air carriers."
It is this provision, among others, to which the Secretary of Trans-
portation pointed as the legal justification for applying NEPA to
the carriers' applications for amended operations specifications."
But may proprietary regulations, too, be sanctioned under this
article? Probably not, in view of the definition of "aeronautical
authorities" in Article IX: with respect to the United States the
term includes only federal aviation authorities, and not local air-
por operators."'
289-356, 411-53 (1962); Lissitzyn, Bilateral Agreements on Air Transport, 30
J. AIR L. & COM. 248 (1965).
" The 1957 air transport agreement between Britain and the Soviet Union
provided in the Annex, Paragraph 18, that noise measurements would be carried
out and that the designated airlines would "carry out any modifications" includ-
ing the use of engine mufflers or special operating procedures "to reduce air-
craft noise to an acceptable level." The provision apparently was included at the
insistence of the British government because of concern over the noise level of
the Russian TU-104 jet transport. B. CHENG, supra note 77, at 329-30, 588.
" United States-France Air Transport Services Agreement, supra note 5.
" Supra note 5.
"United States Standard Form of Bilateral Air Transport Agreement (1971),
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, AERONAUTICAL STATUTES AND RELATED MATERIALS
668 (1974).
82 For parallel provisions see Bermuda I, supra note 5, art. 2(2); Bermuda II,
supra note 5, art. 3(6) (b); United States Standard Form of Bilateral Air Trans-
port Agreement, supra note 81, art. 3.
"'See § 1102, Federal Aviation Act; 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1970) (Secretary of
Transportation shall exercise his powers "consistently with any obligation as-
sumed by the United States in any treaty, convention or agreement .... ").
84For parallel provisions see Bermuda I, supra note 5, art. 12; Bermuda 11,
supra 5, art. 1; United States Standard Form of Bilateral Air Transport Agree-
ment, supra note 81, art. 1.
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At the same time, however, Article V-which restates Article
11 of the Chicago Convention'-provides in part:
The laws and regulations of one Contracting Party relating to the
admission to or departure from its territory of aircraft engaged in
international air navigation, or to the operation and navigation
or such aircraft while within its territory, shall be applied to the
aircraft of the other Contracting Party, and shall be complied with
by such aircraft upon entering or departing from or while within
the territory of the first party."
Unlike the term "aeronautical authorities" in Article II, the term
"Contracting Party" employed in Article V is not circumscribed to
include only the CAB and FAA. Rather, it is undefined. Hence,
it appears that a proprietary noise regulation would be enforceable
against carriers of foreign States such as Britain and France whose
air transport agreements with the United States incorporate provi-
sions such as that quoted above-assuming of course that the re-
striction in question genuinely relates to "admission," "departure,"
"operation," or "navigation" and that it is otherwise valid under
domestic law.
To characterize a maximum takeoff noise limit, or even a ban
on takeoffs by certain aircraft types, as regulations relating to
"admission," "departure," or "operation" does no violence to the
language of the agreement. Absent such an interpretation, more-
over, yet another anomoly of aircraft noise regulation would be
created: airport operators would be barred from enforcing against
foreign carriers the same restrictions which, under Hayward, they
may freely impose upon U.S. carriers. Assuming hypothetically
that the Port of New York Authority were to adopt a takeoff noise
limit exceeded by B-707 aircraft, B-707 flights from Kennedy Air-
port by Trans World Airlines would be barred, while those by
Air France would be allowed. Application of such a double stand-
ard would raise the spectre of discrimination and, if permitted to
function, have massive competitive impact on U.S. carriers.
Therefore, from a logical as well as a textual point of view,
forceful arguments could be made that local noise regulations
85 Chicago Convention, supra note 19, art. 11.
"' For parallel provisions see Bermuda I, supra note 5, art. 5; Bermuda II,
supra note 5, art. 4; United States Standard Form of Bilateral Air Transport
Agreement, supra note 81, art. 5.
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should be permitted under any bilateral agreement embodying a
provision such as Article V of the United States-France Air Trans-
port Agreement. Yet such a result would have far-reaching im-
plications which a court would surely be entitled to take into ac-
count in deciding whether this interpretation was reasonable. The
system of international aviation, like the system of international
law of which it is a part, is built on the fundamental principle of
responsibility. The process of bilateral negotiation, described by
Professor Lowenfeld as "much playing with small weights on a
scale,"" may extend to every ground rule of international air trans-
portation, defining the conditions under which the two nations' air-
lines will later compete and under which their citizens will later be
served. An agreement is initiated only when each side perceives that
it has obtained the most advantageous, set of ground rules for future
operations-politically, economically, and in terms of service-that
it can reasonably expect under the circumstances. If one party sub-
sequently refuses, or is unable, to adhere to an agreed provision,
the bargain struck may be illusory. Yet precisely this danger was
suggested by the proprietary power to impose aircraft noise regu-
lations on foreign air carriers." Certainly some forms of noise reg-
ulation, such as a requirement that aircraft be towed to runways,
could be complied with without materially impairing the agree-
ment. More severe measures imposed by an airport proprietor,
however, such as a curfew, a maximum takeoff noise limit, or an
outright ban on certain aircraft types, could seriously disrupt a
carrier's scheduling, diminish the productivity of its aircraft in-
vestment, and effectively deny an operating right for which some
important concession was paid in bilateral negotiations.
International lawyers have long held the view that "the federal
system of government is particularly ill-adapted to international
8
"Lowenfeld, The High Stakes In a New Air Pact, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1977,
Financial Section at 1, 12.
88 While concentrating his focus on the actions of national governments-
rather than local authorities--one commentator writing nearly a decade ago pre-
dicted that, under the guise of environmental and safety regulation, the major
countries engaged in international civil aviation would resort to "operational
regulatory skirmishes . . . as a means of offsetting the economic competition
brought about by supersonic air transportation." Robinson, The Regulatory Pro-
hibition of International Supersonic Flights, 18 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 833, 846
(1969).
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cooperation."'" Traditionally, the international system dealt with
the problem of the division of competence in federal states by
ignoring it. As the Permanent Court of International Justice
observed in Treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzig, "[a] State
cannot adduce as against another State its own Constitution with
a view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under interna-
tional law or treaties in, force.""' Undoubtedly, the United States
possessed sufficient constitutional power to overcome contrary local
legislation in order to fulfill its international obligations.'1 But this
was not the issue. Rather, the issue was whether the contracting
parties had, albeit perhaps inadvertently, agreed in Article V that
such local regulations should apply. If the resulting scenario--of
a foreign nation losing through airport noise regulations the traffic
rights it had previously gained in bilateral air transport negotiations
-appeared to veer outside traditional channels of international
responsibility and offend American concepts regarding the cen-
tralized conduct of foreign affairs, then those were matters rele-
vant to the court in its consideration of whether, indeed, proprie-
tary noise restrictions were countenanced under Article V.
THE DECISION
District Court
On May 11, 1977, having heard oral argument on the legal
issues, United States District Court Judge Milton Pollack granted
summary judgment to British Airways and Air France and declared
the Port Authority Concorde ban illegal." Finding it unnecessary
to address the question of whether the Concorde ban offended
international law, the district court declared that the Port Authority
resolution was "in irreconcilable conflict with the federal exami-
nation of the question and the federal orders thereon"" and there-
fore invalid under the Supremacy Clause.
8' Sorensen, Federal States and the International Protection of Human Rights,
46 AM. J. INT'L L. 195, 218 (1952).
"Advisory Opinion, Permanent Court of International Justice ser. A/B,
no. 44, at 24 (1932). With regard to this problem, see generally I. BERNIER, IN-
TERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF FEDERALISM (1973); Looper, Limitations on the
Treaty Power in Federal States, 34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1045 (1959).
"U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
"431 F. Supp. 1216 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
9"Id. at 1226.
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The vague and rather general grounds quoted in the preceding
sentence are representative of the reasoning presented throughout
the decision. The constitutional conflict identified by the court was
not with any single federal statute or regulation, but with an
amalgam of federal powers underlying the Secretary of Transpor-
tation's decision to authorize a sixteen month Concorde demon-
stration. The Department of Transportation and the FAA, Judge
Pollack observed, are vested with broad powers under their organic
legislation. In addition to the power to regulate the use of the
navigable airspace," these include the powers "to encourage and
foster the development of civil aeronautics and air commerce in
the United States and abroad,"" to develop "national transporta-
tion policies and programs conducive to the provision of fast,
safe, efficient, and convenient transportation,""' to "stimulate tech-
nological advances in transportation,"" and to "undertake or super-
vise such developmental work and service testing as tends to the
creation of improved aircraft engines, propellors, and appliances.""
Moreover, the agency has a special responsibility with respect to
aircraft noise. The Department of Transportation Act authorizes
it to "promote and undertake research relating to transportation,
including noise abatement, with particular attention to aircraft
noise,"" while section 611 of the Federal Aviation Act, as amended
by the Noise Control Act of 1972, confers the wide-ranging air-
craft noise abatement authority at the heart of the Supreme Court's
decision in Burbank.
It was pursuant to all of these powers, the court observed, that
the Secretary of Transportation conducted his detailed analysis and
concluded that federal approval should be given for a limited,
sixteen month demonstration of Concorde service to Dulles and
Kennedy airports. Were the Port Authority resolution permitted
to stand, the Secretary's goal of "testing the environmental conse-
"Federal Aviation Act, § 307, 49 U.S.C. § 1348 (1970).
"Federal Aviation Act, § 305, 49 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970).
"Department of Transportation Act, § 2(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970).
"Department of Transportation Act, § 2(b)(1), 49 U.S.C. § 1651(b)(1)
(1970).
"Federal Aviation Act, § 312(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1353(b) (1970).
"Department of Transportation Act, § 4(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1653(a) (1970).
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quences and commercial viability of the Concorde!'" in actual
operation would be substantially frustrated.
But what of the proprietary right to impose noise limits, man-
dated in the legislative history of section 611, given judicial sanc-
tion in Hayward and recognition by Secretary Coleman in his
Concorde decision? For two reasons, the court suggested, its deci-
sion was fully consistent with the general concept of noise regula-
tion by airport operators. First, although sometimes using the
terms interchangeably, the court indicated that its holding was
based on "conflict" rather than "preemption," and limited to the
special facts of the case."0' Thus, while the Port Authority was not
totally preempted from enforcing measures to mitigate aircraft
noise, it had in this instance sought to block a unique test that the
Secretary of Transportation, as a matter of national policy and
pursuant to statute, had decided should take place.
Secondly-and more importantly-the district court character-
ized the proprietary noise control power as "a delegated authority
reviewable by and subject to the overriding control of federal
authority when exercised.".... That is, the FAA had permitted air-
port proprietors to exercise limited noise control power as a matter
of regulatory power. As this grant of power was discretionary,
however, it could be withdrawn by the FAA on an ad hoc basis
where necessary for fulfillment of important federal goals.
It is true, the court acknowledged, that the FAA's policy of
shared responsibility had been described approvingly in Congres-
sional reports on section 611; but in doing so, Congress merely
was signalling its intent neither to overrule the agency's fluid
policy nor to transform it into binding law. The fate of proprietary
noise controls, the court read Congress to be saying, should con-
tinue to rest with the FAA.
[The] Congressional statement refers, not to any restriction on
the pervasive power granted in the statute, but to the voluntarily
granted authority as a matter of FAA policy, delegated to local
airport proprietors in the matter of regulating noise. This dele-
'0 Secretary's Decision, supra note 27, at 22.
101 Citing the Supreme Court's recent observation in Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977), that "Congressional enactments that do not exclude
all state legislation in the same field nevertheless override state laws with which
they conflict."
102431 F. Supp. at 1222.
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gation was at the will and subject to the ultimate pervasive fed-
eral control.'"
Restated in constitutional terms, the FAA had power in appropriate
cases to reserve its acquiescence in local regulation, thereby creat-
ing a Supremacy Clause conflict. The Concorde experiment, in
Judge Pollack's view, presented just such a case.
Court of Appeals
The district court's decision was reviewed by a panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit composed of Chief
Judge Kaufman and Circuit Judges Mansfield and Van Graafeiland.
Prior to oral argument that panel issued requests for amicus curiae
briefs to the Departments of Transportation and State asking that
they address, respectively, the domestic and international legal
questions in issue.
In a single amicus curiae brief submitted on behalf of both
agencies, the Department of Justice declined to address the ques-
tion of whether the Port Authority ban violated the United States'
international obligations on the ground that negotiations with Great
Britain on a replacement for the Bermuda Agreement were then
in the final and most sensitive stages.1'" With respect to the con-
stitutional question upon which the district court decision had been
based, however, the brief concluded that the Secretary's order pro-
visionally amending the operations specifications of British Air-
ways and Air France to allow a sixteen month Concorde demon-
stration did not render the Port Authority ban invalid on Suprem-
acy Clause grounds. The basis for this disagreement with the dis-
trict court lay in differing interpretations of Congressional intent.
What Judge Pollack read as merely a description of current FAA
largesse, subject to withdrawal, the government read as an affirma-
tive instruction that proprietors not be displaced, provided that
their actions did not interfere with the FAA's regulation of safety,
or impose an undue burden on interstate or foreign commerce.
The government brief went on, however, to suggest an alterna-
tive ground on which Judge Pollack's decision might be affirmed.
In enacting section 611, the Senate Commerce Committee had
13Id. at 1221.
" 4 See note 5 supra.
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cautioned that airport proprietors could exclude aircraft on the
basis of noise considerations "so long as such exclusion is non-
discriminatory.""' The only objective noise standard adopted by
the Port Authority was the rule establishing a maximum takeoff
noise of 112 PNdB at monitoring points in adjacent communities.
This test, it was thought, Concorde could pass. The court might
determine that the Port Authority's indefinite ban on Concorde,
then in its fourteenth month, coupled with its failure to adopt any
regulation excluding SST's according to an objective standard of
noise emission, constituted arbitrary, unreasonable, and therefore
discriminatory action.
The court of appeal's decision followed closely the argument
suggested by the government brief. Characterizing the grounds for
Judge Pollack's grant of summary judgment as "simply untenable
and erroneous," the court reviewed the "repeated disavowal by
federal officials of any attempt to preempt the Port Authority's
right to subject the Concorde to reasonable noise regulations...1
In particular, it repeated Secretary Coleman's own statements re-
garding the right of airport proprietors to refuse landing rights on
environmental grounds, and the reaffirmation of this position by
his successor as Secretary of Transportation, Brock Adams.
But this did not settle the matter. The court found that "the
government has raised an important and viable point"'' 7 in stress-
ing the conditional nature of Congress' acquiescence in noise
regulation by airport operators.
We believe the scope of the Port Authority's power as an airport
proprietor to impose use restrictions based on noise considerations
is defined by the limited role Congress reserved for it in the
national scheme we have briefly sketched. The proper domain of
the operator is the "issu[ance of regulations] or establish[ment
of requirements] as to the permissable level of noise which can
be created by aircraft using the airport." S. Rep. No. 1353, supra
at 6. It is clear to us that the Port Authority is vested only with
the power to promulgate reasonable, nonarbitrary and nondis-
criminatory regulations that establish acceptable noise levels for
the airport and its immediate environs."'
I" See text accompanying notes 73-74 supra.
"0' 558 F.2d at 82.
107 Id.
log Id. at 84 (emphasis added).
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In any event, the court pointed out, the obligation of airport
proprietors to adopt only reasonable and nondiscriminatory aircraft
noise standards did not need to be implied from legislative history.
Two independent sources imposed the same limitation. First, the
Airport and Airway Development Act, which establishes the terms
and conditions under which federal funds are channeled to the
Port Authority, expressly requires that Kennedy Airport be made
"available for public use on fair and reasonable terms and without
unjust discrimination. ' "
Secondly, under the Commerce Clause, unfair or discriminatory
conduct would "unconstitutionally burden the commerce Congress
sought to foster.""' This was underscored, in the court's view, by
a "striking" ' analogy to the recent Supreme Court decision in
Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc. "' In that case, plaintiff, holder
of federal fishing licenses, challenged Virginia statutes which
limited the issuance of state fishing licenses to United States citi-
zens and barred nonresidents from fishing in the Virginia portion
of the Chesapeake Bay. As a United Kingdom-owned corporation
incorporated in Delaware, Seacoast was subject to both exclusions.
Relying on Gibbons v. Ogden,"' the Supreme Court held that under
the Supremacy Clause, plaintiff's federal license constituted a grant
of authority to fish in Virginia waters on the same terms as Vir-
ginia residents, to which the conflicting state restrictions, aimed at
aliens and nonresidents, must yield. The federal license, however,
while prohibiting state exclusion of nonresidents, did not confer
immunity from all state regulation. Rather, the Court held that
the states may impose upon federal licensees reasonable nondis-
criminatory conservation and environmental protection measures
1Airport and Airway Development Act (AADA), § 18(1), 49 U.S.C. §
1718(1) (1970). See City of Dallas v. Southwest Airlines Co., 494 F.2d 773
(5th Cir. 1974), reh. denied, 496 F.2d 1407 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1079 (1974), reh. denied, 420 U.S. 913 (1975) (city, as airport proprietor
and recipient of federal funds under AADA, could not exclude airline so long as
airport continued to operate); Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n v. Port Authority,
305 F. Supp. 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (proprietary system of landing fees designed to
divert general aviation away from large commercial airports to less congested
airports during peak hours held not unjustly discriminatory).
110 558 F.2d at 84.
1Id. at 85.
112431 U.S. 265 (1977).
11322 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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"to effectuate a legitimate local public interest.".1 .
In the Concorde case, as in Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc.,
the Second Circuit reasoned, local and federal regulation could
co-exist, provided the local regulations were exercised in a non-
discriminatory fashion and complemented federal policy.
Congress has reserved to proprietors the authority to enact reason-
able noise regulations, as an exercise of ownership rights in the
airport, because they are in a better position to assure the public
weal. Under this scheme, foreign commercial airlines are not im-
munized from the operation of the normal incidents of the local
power. But pervading this strategy of national-local cooperation,
and inherent in it, is the understanding and, indeed, necessity that
the local body will not unreasonably hinder the accomplishment
of legitimate national goals.'"
Finally, the court examined briefly the Port Authority's responsi-
bilities under international law and found that they paralleled close-
ly those arising under domestic law. By their actions, the carriers
had acknowledged that, under the American system of shared re-
sponsibility, they are not exempt from generally applied local regu-
lations merely because their operations are conducted pursuant to
the Chicago Convention and relevant bilateral agreements. Indeed,
the court observed, "British and French airlines have complied
with JFK's rule excluding jet aircraft producing more than 112
PNdB for nearly two decades, apparently without complaint.' 1.
Accordingly, "new and reasonable regulations tailored to the
special noise characteristics of the SST""' would not be invalid
merely because Concorde is operated only by foreign airlines. On
the other hand, disparate treatment of U.S. and foreign airlines
based on unspecified or unscientific factors unrelated to the noise
characteristics of the aircraft involved would raise a serious ques-
114431 U.S. 278. Accord: Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S.
440 (1960) (ship boilers licensed and inspected in accordance with federal law
held subject to municipal anti-pollution regulations); Manchester v. Massachu-
setts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891) (out-of-state resident holding federal fisheries license
held subject to nondiscriminatory state ban on certain types of fishing tackle);
Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855) (federally licensed vessel held
subject to nondiscriminatory state law regarding implements that could be used
in oyster fishing).
115 58 F.2d at 85.
"a id. at 86.
"1 Id.
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tion of "compatibility with American treaty arrangements. 11. To
resolve whether the Port Authority's thirteen month ban and ac-
companying failure to adopt any new noise standard governing
Concorde and other airplanes was so exclusive as to be unreason-
able, arbitrary, or discriminatory-and therefore illegal-a remand
to the district court for an evidentiary hearing was ordered.
District Court: Remand
The question before Judge Pollack, then, was whether any
reasonable justification existed for the Port Authority's indefinite
ban. On the basis of the evidence adduced, he concluded there
was none."' First, the court found, there was no longer any reason-
able doubt that Concorde could meet the Port Authority's 112
PNdB limit; the aircraft had demonstrated its ability to "beat the
meter" in simulations conducted at Tolouse and Casablanca in
1974."'
Although the Federal Environmental Impact Statement pre-
pared for the Coleman decision projected that Concorde's noise
contour at JFK would be far larger than those created by subsonic
jets, British Airways and Air France had recently proposed a plan
to reduce operating weights and confine takeoffs, to the maximum
extent feasible, to less noise-sensitive runways. The result, con-
firmed as technically accurate by the FAA, was to shrink Con-
corde's noise footprint at Kennedy to the point where it was com-
parable to that of a Boeing 707-320-B, one of the noisiest subsonic
jets. Hence, the court concluded, this feature of Concorde noise
could no longer be put forward by the Port Authority as a basis
for denying the aircraft a test.
11
One dimension of Concorde's performance still marked by a
measure of uncertainty, however, was its vibrational effect. Owing
to the greater proportion of low-frequency sound in Concorde's
noise emission, as compared with subsonic aircraft, an equivalent
level of SST noise might result in a higher level of annoyance.
The Port Authority argued that time was needed to commission
further studies of Concorde-induced vibration, and it was on this
I1 d.
119437 F. Supp. 804, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
120Id. at 810.
11Id. at 815.
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basis that it sought to justify its indefinite ban."' Although the Port
Authority's psychoacoustic expert had devoted months to the task,
he had been unable to develop any technique for predicting the
additional human annoyance, if any, caused by Concorde's low-
frequency content. To answer this elusive question, the evidence
showed, could require six to twelve months and cost as much as
$1 million-a project upon which the Port Authority showed no
inclination to embark.' "
In sum, the court found, several apprehensions concerning Con-
corde's noise impact at Kennedy Airport had been allayed; the
remainder had already been subjected to thorough study in the
Federal Environmental Impact Statement, the sixty-one page Cole-
man decision, the monthly monitoring reports of Concorde service
to Dulles and reports by the Port Authority's own consultants. On
March 11, 1976, when the Port Authority adopted its Concorde
ban there already existed "a vast quantity of reference works and
studies and known scientific data concerning supersonics, includ-
ing community response thereto and graphic portrayals thereof....
The research on vibration performed by the Port Authority's con-
sultants "established nothing beyond what was adequately con-
sidered and reported on by Secretary Coleman.' '..
It is unreal for P.A. to say we are helpless to theoretically quantify
the additive effect of the vibration created by Concorde on Con-
corde's noise-and at the same time to bar use of the airport
under the circumstances shown herein under the guise of con-
ducting more studies to resolve the unknown aspects of the vari-
ables. Yet, this is precisely what P.A. espouses to be concerned
with.
The conclusion is inescapable from the evidence presented to the
Court and the Court finds that the P.A. has no intention of taking
the responsibility of setting the present or another noise standard
applicable to the Concorde."6
The Port Authority had refused either to allow test flights or
to issue a generally applicable noise standard that would take
account of low-frequency vibration; at the same time it was "re-
" Id. at 812.
123 Id. at 807.
24 1d. at 812.
i25 Id. at 817.
1" Id. at 818.
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ploughing old ground and doing reviews of scientific and theo-
retical data previously available.'. 2 This conduct, Judge Pollack
concluded, was "unreasonable, discriminatory and unfair and an
impingement on commerce"'28 under the conditions for proprietary
power established by Congress and interpreted by the court of
appeals.
The court of appeals concurred in this finding by the district
court and affirmed, with minor modification, its order enjoining
the Port Authority from enforcing its anti-Concorde ban."" The
Supreme Court declined review. '
CONCLUSIONS
As a news event, British Airways v. Port Authority is likely to
be viewed as a serious setback for airport operators seeking to
ameliorate aircraft noise. In reality, of course, it is neither a setback
nor an advance. Rather, the law remains in the same ambivalent
and somewhat contradictory state; airport proprietors are at once
told that their noise abatement authority has not been preempted,
and at the same time warned to tred delicately so that their stand-
ards and procedures do not create an actual conflict with FAA
regulation in the safety or noise control fields, are not unreasonable
or unjustly discriminatory, and do not impose an undue burden
on interstate or foreign commerce.
In the end, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals shed little new
light on the broad claims under domestic and international law
asserted by British Airways and Air France. Perhaps the panel
was mindful of the maxim that hard-and politically charged-
cases make bad law; or perhaps it was simply guided by a natural
tendency to judicial conservatism. In any event, by tying its de-
cision closely to the Port Authority's dilatory conduct, the court
has left a number of important questions to continuing debate.
Although pointing to statements by former Secretary Coleman
and his successor as evidence that the federal decision approving
a sixteen month Concorde demonstration was not intended to
'"Id. at 817.
"Id. at 818.
129 564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977).
130 U.S. -, 98 S.Ct. 291 (1977).
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preclude the Port Authority in this instance, the court of appeals
voiced no opinion on the question of whether the DOT or the FAA
may ever supersede airport operators through selective regulatory
action. The decisions in Port Authority of New York v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc.' and Opinion of the Justices,"' as well as Justice
Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Burbank," all appear to take
the position that although airport proprietors are not preempted,
the exercise of federal administrative authority will oust proprie-
tary regulation with which it conflicts. Given the federal disavowal
of any attempt to displace regulation of Concorde by the Port
Authority, the panel was not required to decide whether the legis-
lative history of section 611 constitutes a restriction by Congress
of such administrative latitude. Hence, while terming the district
court's initial decision "simply untenable and erroneous, ' " it would
appear that this characterization was directed less to Judge Pol-
lack's overall concept of ad hoc federal supremacy, and more to
his finding about whether such power had, in fact, been exercised
in this case.
The court of appeals obviously was sensitive to the consequences
its decision might have for the regime of aircraft noise liability.
A number of commentators have called for the reversal of Griggs
v. Allegheny County," arguing that the ruling in that case places
"the financial burden of aircraft noise on the segment of the avia-
tion community that [can] do the least about it."'' Another de-
13 259 F. Supp. 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1966). The decision upheld the airport op-
erator's runway preference regulation against the claim of federal preemption
turned on a finding that the FAA "is not prepared at the present time to direct
[the use of the prohibited runway] in the interest of safety or to pre-empt the
regulation of its use in contradiction of Port Authority's rules and regulations."
Id. at 753.
11359 Mass. 778; 271 N.E.2d 354, 358 (1971). See discussion at note 66,
supra.
133 411 U.S. 625, 641-54. Justice Rehnquist observed:
Clearly Congress could pre-empt the field to local regulation if it
chose, and very likely the authority conferred on the Administrator
of the Federal Aviation Administration by [section 611 of the
Federal Aviation Act] is sufficient to authorize him to promulgate
regulations effectively pre-empting local action.
Id. at 653.
184 558 F.2d at 82.
133369 U.S. 84 (1962).
" Berger, You Know I Can't Hear You When the Planes Are Flying, 4
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cision denying noise control power to an airport proprietor might
have been the straw that broke Griggs' back and transferred liabil-
ity for the taking of air easements to the federal government. The
decision in British Airways v. Port Authority does not provide
that straw.
The court of appeals' initial decision also supplies a practical
rationale for the much-criticized distinction between proprietary
power and police power drawn in City of Burbank v. Lockheed
Air Terminal.'7 It is not merely a distinction needed for consis-
tency with Griggs. Undoubtedly, the need to allow airport operators
some regulatory tools to minimize their exposure to noise suits
is one basis for the distinction. But there is also another explana-
tion. As the court observed:
It is understandable that the numerous localities in the vicinity
of major airports cannot be permitted an independent role in con-
trolling the noise of passing aircraft. The likelihood of multiple,
inconsistent rules would be a dagger pointed at the heart of com-
merce-and the rule applied might come literally to depend on
which way the wind was blowing. The task of protecting the local
population from aircraft noise has, accordingly, fallen to the
agency, usually of local government, charged with operating the
airport. [Footnotes] Indeed, since the operator controls the location
of the facility, acquires the property and air easement and is often
able to assure compatible land use, he is liable for compensable
takings by low-flying aircraft, [citing Griggs]. The right of the pro-
prietor to limit his liability by restricting the use of his airport
has been thought a corollary of this principle. It is perhaps more
important, however, that the inherently local aspect of noise con-
trol can be most effectively left to the operator, as the unitary local
authority who controls airport access.'
In short, the chaotic consequences which could ensue from regu-
lation by a patchwork of airport-neighboring communities with
each attempting to enforce its own rule, are absent where regu-
lation is effected by the "unitary" airport operator. The validity
of this distinction is underscored, as a practical matter, when one
bears in mind that the airport operator, unlike communities im-
URBAN LAWYER 1, 22 (1972); Lesser, The Aircraft Noise Problem: Federal Power
but Local Liability, 3 URBAN LAWYER 175, 202 (1971).
137411 U.S. 624 (1973).
"1 558 F.2d at 83 (emphasis added).
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mediately adjacent to the airport, has a commercial interest in
promoting airline service to his terminal which counterbalances
his desire to avoid noise liability. Seen in this manner, the practice
of allowing a unit of local government wearing its proprietor's
hat to exercise the same noise control powers forbidden to it when
wearing the police power hat, does not seem nearly as anomolous
or artificial.
With regard to international law, perhaps the most significant
feature of the court of appeals' decision is its express reliance on
Article V of the United States-France Bilateral Air Transport
Agreement, and the corresponding provision of the United States-
Britain agreement, in stating that the operations of Air France and
British Airways are subject to proprietary noise control regula-
tions. 3' At the same time, the court cautioned, international law
requires that such regulations be nondiscriminatory in application.
In this connection, two additional provisions not specifically dis-
cussed by the court, might profitably have been invoked. First,
as noted earlier, Article II of the United States-France bilateral
agreement," and the parallel provision of the United States-Britain
agreement, 141 state that designated air carriers may be required to
demonstrate compliance with "the laws and regulations normally
applied" to the operation of commercial air carriers (emphasis
added). To similar effect, Articule 15 of the Chicago Convention"
states that every airport in a contracting State open to public use
by its national aircraft "shall likewise ... be open under uniform
conditions to the aircraft of all the other contracting States." Al-
though admittedly the Port Authority's Concorde ban did not
discriminate--either facially or as enforced-on the basis of
nationality,"'4 the gravamen of the court's holding was that Con-
corde had been subjected to higher regulatory hurdles than those
placed before other aircraft, both now and in the past.
The finding of discrimination made British Airways v. Port Au-
thority a relatively easy case under international (as well as domes-
'89 Id. at 85.
11 United States-France Air Transport Services Agreement, supra note 5, art.
II.
141 Bermuda I, supra note 5, art. II.
11 Chicago Convention, supra note 19, art. 15 (emphasis added).
143 558 F.2d at 85.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
tic) law. A more difficult case will be posed if the Port Authority
accepts the court of appeals' invitation to adopt new, nondiscrim-
inatory noise standards1" and if those standards permit access by
all jet transports except SST's. But this project only serves to
highlight the broader problem which it illustrates. Even as tem-
ered by the requirement of nondiscrimination, the typical bilateral
provisions permitting the application of "laws and regulations"
of the host country " contain a remarkable degree of elasticity.
A nation that imposes a ban on overland supersonic flight to pre-
vent sonic boom today may impose a ban on jumbo jets to prevent
airport congestion tomorrow (without mentioning, of course, that
jumbos represent the addition of capacity that the host country
views with disfavor); a nation that routes particularly noisy foreign
aircraft away from heavily populated areas today may increase
the circuity of the routings tomorrow (while denying that this is
an anti-competitive artifice). For the United States' counterparts
in bilateral air negotiations, the problem is compounded by the
role of the airport proprietor.
Presumably, both problems are amenable to solution through
the development of new and more exacting bilateral provisions.
Yet it is interesting to note that in formulating Bermuda II, two
nations keenly aware of this problem-the United States and Bri-
tain--carried forward virtually unchanged the "laws and regula-
tions" provisions of Bermuda ." For the foreseeable future, at
least, the precise bounds of proprietary noise control power will
require case-by-case determination.
'Id. at 86.
1" See, e.g., United States-France Air Transport Services Agreement, supra
note 5, art. V; Bermuda I, supra note 5, art. V.
14 Bermuda II, supra note 5, art. IV.
